Nepal has opened foreign employment opportunities in 149 countries, often presented as a sign of diplomatic reach and labour mobility. Yet the more concerning figure is that the government has signed bilateral labour agreements with only 13 of those destinations. For a country that relies heavily on foreign employment to sustain households and support the national economy, this gap is not merely administrative—it is a failure of state responsibility. The recent signing of a labour agreement with Saudi Arabia is a welcome step. An estimated 340,000 Nepali workers are employed in Saudi Arabia alone, many of whom have spent years without the protection of a formal state-to-state framework. Until now, the absence of an agreement exposed workers to exploitative practices, including the much-criticised Kafala system, which restricts workers’ freedom to change jobs or return home without employer consent. That such vulnerabilities persisted for decades underscores how reactive, rather than proactive, Nepal’s labour diplomacy has been. A similar situation exists in most other labour destinations. In countries where no bilateral labour agreements exist, Nepali workers routinely face wage exploitation, unsafe working and living conditions, arbitrary contract changes, and weak or inaccessible grievance redress mechanisms.
Nepal proposes updating MoU on labour issue with Bahrain
When disputes arise, workers are often left to navigate hostile systems alone, with limited support from their own state. Opening labour markets without securing enforceable protections amounts to sending citizens abroad at their own risk. The government must urgently address this situation. Bilateral labour agreements are not merely symbolic documents. Properly negotiated and implemented, they are practical tools that define minimum wages, working hours, occupational safety standards, access to health services, social security coverage, and clear procedures for contract enforcement and dispute resolution. They also align labour migration with domestic laws and International Labour Organization (ILO) standards, strengthening Nepal’s ability to demand accountability from destination countries. Government officials acknowledge these benefits. The Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security notes that such agreements enhance employment security, curb recruitment-related fraud, prevent human trafficking, and promote transparency in the labour supply chain. Yet progress remains painfully slow. As labour migration expert Ganesh Gurung points out, Nepal has failed to maximise the economic and social returns of foreign employment because it has not invested sufficient diplomatic effort in formalising labour arrangements.
Given that remittances remain a cornerstone of Nepal’s economy, this inertia is indefensible. Workers continue to bear the cost—in lost wages, broken health, legal limbo, and, in the worst cases, loss of life. Each unregulated destination country represents not an opportunity but a risk exported along with labour. The way forward is clear. The government must prioritise labour agreements as a core pillar of foreign policy, not as an afterthought. Negotiations should be accelerated with major destination countries where Nepali workers are already present in large numbers. Embassies must be better resourced to monitor implementation, and agreements must be regularly reviewed to reflect changing labour markets and emerging forms of exploitation. Opening doors to foreign jobs is not enough. The state has a duty to ensure that when Nepalis cross borders to work, they do so with dignity, security, and enforceable rights. Anything less reduces labour migration to a gamble—one that too many Nepali families can no longer afford.
